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PRESTASI SYARIKAT YANG MEMPUNYAI HUBUNGAN POLITIK DALAM 
JANGKA MASA PANJANG DAN JANGKA MASA PENDEK: KAJIAN DARI 
MALAYSIA 
ABSTRAK 
Objektif tesis ini ialah untuk menyiasat perkaitan antara hubungan politik dengan 
prestasi syarikat-syarikat di Malaysia dalam jangka masa panjang dan jangka masa pendek. Tesis 
ini menggunakan data yang lebih terkini berbanding kajian sebelum ini. Ini adalah kerana kajian-
kajian yang dilakukan sebelum ini terlalu bergantung kepada data yang disediakan oleh Gomez 
dan Jomo (1997), yang dikumpul hampir lapan belas tahun yang lalu, tanpa apa-apa 
pengemaskinian. Kajian ini berharap dapat membetulkan masalah ini kerana siasatan 
menggunakan data yang tidak sesuai akan menyebabkan keputusan yang tidak tepat. Selain itu, 
kajian ini juga mengasingkan hubungan politik kepada empat jenis yang berbeza. Sampel kajian 
ini ialah dari tahun 2002 – 2013, merangkumi sekitar 500 syarikat-syarikat Malaysia yang 
tersenarai. Untuk analisis jangka panjang, kajian ini menggunakan analisa GMM manakala panel 
regresi digunakan untuk memeriksa konsistensi keputusan yang dijana. Untuk analisis jangka 
pendek, metodologi ‘event study’ telah digunakan untuk mengira pulangan tambahan daripada 
setiap peristiwa yang dikaji. Dalam jangka masa panjang, didapati bahawa tiga jenis hubungan 
politik mempunyai kesan positif ke atas prestasi syarikat dan hubugan politik melalui GLC 
mempunyai kesan paling tinggi terhadap prestasi syarikat berbanding dengan hubungan lain. 
Dalam jangka masa pendek, hubungan politik tidak mempunyai kesan yang tinggi ke atas 
syarikat. Kajian ini mendapati peristiwa berjadual seperti belanjawan kerajaan dan pilihan raya 
tidak memberi kesan pada firma. Walau bagaimanapun, hubungan politik mempunyai kesan 
yang lebih besar ke atas prestasi syarikat semasa peristiwa tidak berjadual seperti peralihan 
kepimpinan dan pengumuman dasar-dasar ekonomi.  
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THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS IN LONG-
RUN AND SHORT-RUN: EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIA 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether political connection is important to firm 
performance in Malaysia in both the long-run and short-run. This thesis uses a more updated and 
reliable data compared to previous studies being done in this area in Malaysia. The issue with 
previous studies being done is that they are still relying on data provided by Gomez and Jomo 
(1997) which was collected almost eighteen years ago, without any forms of updating. This study 
hope to rectify that situation as investigations using an outdated data will cause the results to be 
inaccurate. Other than that, this study also separates political connection into four different types. 
The sample frame for this study is from year 2002 – 2013 covering about 500 Malaysian public 
listed firms. For long-run analysis, this study uses GMM methodology whereas panel regression 
is used as the robustness check. For short-run analysis, event study methodology was done to 
calculate the abnormal return from each type of events studied. In the long-run, it is found that 
three types of political connection have a positive impact on firm performance. However, GLCs 
have the highest impact on firm performance compared to the others. In short-run, political 
connection does not affect performance in every event studied. Political connection does not 
have impact during scheduled event like government budget and general election. However, 
political connection has a larger impact on firm performance during unscheduled events like 
leadership transition and economic policies announcement. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
  
As an individual, it made sense to establish good relationship with people we 
deal with every day, both personally and in business. When we have good 
relationship with others, they are more willing to help us in return as the feel good 
factor is present. For firms, building good relationship surpasses beyond their 
relationships with customers. This includes good relationships between employees 
within the organization itself. Many successful businessmen such as Richard Branson 
have touched on the importance of building good relationships on every level of the 
business process. A few notable quotes on business relationships are mentioned 
below: 
 
“Success in business is all about making connections.” 
Richard Branson, founder of Virgin Group 
 
“Business is not just doing deeds; business is having great products, doing great 
engineering, and providing tremendous service to customers. Finally, business is a 
cobweb of human relationships.” 
Ross Perot, founder of Electronic Data System 
(EDS) and former US presidential candidate 
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“Build the right relationships with the right people and nurture them overtime and 
you will always have a leg up on the competition.” 
Paul May, BuzzStream CEO 
 
Besides having good relationships with customers and employees, many firms 
have also realized long ago that having good relationships with politicians is an 
added advantage, particularly in countries with weak legal and governance 
institutions. As mentioned by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), establishing connections 
to political parties in power to gain economic advantage is an old practice in all 
societies. The incentive for firms to be politically connected is recognized by citizens 
of the affected countries (Faccio, 2006) as there is much to gain. As past literatures 
have pointed out, these advantages includes getting government contracts and 
monopolies (Friedman, 1999; Johnson & Mitton, 2003), less taxation (De Soto, 
1989), preferential treatment by government-owned enterprises such as banks 
(Backman, 1999; Dinc, 2005; Claessen, Feijen & Laeven, 2008) and relaxed 
regulatory oversight of company in question (Stigler, 1971; De Soto, 1989). 
 
The advantages mentioned above points to one thing, which is better firm 
performance. There are plethora studies about the positive impact of political 
connections on firm performance. One of the most significant studies was done by 
Fisman (2001) where he studied the value of political connections to President 
Suharto of Indonesia who held the office for 31 years since 1967. Fisman used the 
announcements of Suharto’s declining health to measure the value of the firms that 
are connected to President Suharto and found that over 20% of their value is derived 
from its political connection. Besides that, Ramalho (2003) investigated the 1992 
presidential impeachment in Brazil to gauge the impact of an anti-corruption 
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campaign on politically connected firms. She concluded that the stock value of 
politically connected firms dropped around the dates of the campaign. Additionally, 
Faccio (2006) have also documented that the announcement of a new political 
connection resulted in a significant increase in value of the respective firm. Other 
studies include Faccio et. al (2006), Charumilind, Kali and Wiwwatanakantang 
(2006), Claessens et. al (2008), Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou (2008) and Dinc (2005). 
 
Some researchers such as Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) have tried to point out 
the reasons as to why politically connected firms might have stronger performance 
than their non-connected peers. First, delegates might engage in non-parliamentary 
job activities to maintain contact to firms and voters in order to be informed about the 
needs and demands of the population. For reputational purposes, these delegates 
might only choose the best performing firm to work for. Secondly, politicians are 
often outsiders to the corporate world and might be beneficial to the firm by 
providing an independent view on the organization, which eventually positively 
affects performance. 
 
Political connection also could bring disadvantages to firms as well. For 
example, Opper (2007) discovered that government-appointed CEOs experience 
lower sales performance, disadvantages in credit allocation and experiences further 
postponements in custom clearance. Jackowicz, Kozlowski and Mielcarz (2013) also 
found lower profitability in politically connected firms particularly in firm has many 
connections, have a politically connected supervisory board and those which hired 
former politicians with central government experience.  Another study by Faccio 
(2006) concludes that politically connected firms do not perform as well as their non-
connected counterparts in a sample of 42 countries. Furthermore, Fan, Wong and 
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Zhang (2007) also reported that politically connected CEO of listed firms in China 
has lower performance compared to non-connected CEOs.  Boubakri, Cosset and 
Saffar (2008) also found that politically connected firms lacked motivation in 
increasing shareholder wealth and increased firm performance after privatization. 
Additionally, they also demonstrate poorer accounting performance compared to 
their non-connected counterparts. 
 
There seems to be no consensus as to whether political connection is good or 
bad for firms, which in turn becomes the motivation of this research. This study 
hopes to contribute to the existing literature about the impact of political connection 
on firm performance in the short-run and long-run. There are studies on the effect of 
politically connected firms and their performance in Malaysia, but they are not in 
abundance. One of earliest and most significant study in this area in Malaysia is by 
Gomez and Jomo (1997) where they identified firms that are connected to politicians 
or political groups in power in Malaysia. Using the data provided by Gomez and 
Jomo (1997), Johnson and Mitton (2003) investigated the impact of the 
implementation of capital control during 1998 on politically connected firms and the 
evidence suggested Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which 
favoured firms could be supported. Besides that, Fazilah (1996) documented that 
politically connected firms received preferential treatment from government and they 
have higher performance during positive economic period. Other studies includes 
Rasiah (1998), Adhikari, Derashid and Zhang (2006), Gul (2006), Wahab, Zain, 
James and Haron (2009) and Bliss and Gul (2012). 
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Malaysia is an interesting country to investigate because (according to Table 
1), Malaysia recorded the highest amount of firms that are politically connected 
through close relationship with a total of 65 firms, followed by Indonesia with 22 and 
Thailand with 19. Moreover, Malaysia is the country with third highest percentage of 
firms connected (or close relationship) with a minister or MP, losing only to 
Indonesia and Russia. Malaysia’s score was 19.78%, Indonesia 22.08% and Russia 
20.00%. Furthermore, in terms market capitalization of connected firms, Malaysia is 
the fourth among 47 countries with a market capitalization of 28.24%. Russia is the 
country with the highest market capitalization among connected firms with a 
whopping 86.75%, followed by Thailand with 41.62% and United Kingdom with 
39.02%.  
 
 Although the issue of politically connected firms has been examined in the 
context of Malaysia, it requires a revisit as the political scenario has changed 
tremendously over the past decade. Studies like Johnson and Mitton (2003) and 
Mitchell and Joseph (2010) were conducted during the period of higher political 
stability and the value of political connection is postulated to be higher during this 
period. On the contrary, the political scene in Malaysia has matured over the past 10 
years and political stability has become a concern compared to previously.  
 
An important contribution of this study is the data collected. Firstly, most 
studies which focuses on the issue of political connection in Malaysia such as 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Joseph and Mitchell (2010) uses outdated data from 
Gomez and Jomo (1997). On the contrary with these studies, part of the data used in 
this study is updated from Gomez and Jomo (1997). The process of updating this data 
is to filter out firms which are no longer considered as connected so that the results 
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obtained will be accurate. Secondly, another set of data which records the firms 
which have a politically connected individual in its board of directors are being hand-
collected from the annual reports available in Bursa Malaysia. To our knowledge, 
most studies in this area only focuses on connection through friends and family 
members, neglecting the possible effect of connection through board members. The 
lack of easily obtained data also made this type of connection less favourable to 
study.  
 
Table 1: Country distribution of firms with political connections 
Country No. 
of 
firms 
with 
avail
able 
data 
No. of 
firms 
connecte
d with a 
minister 
or MP 
% of 
firms 
connecte
d with a 
minister 
or MP 
No. of 
firms 
connected 
through 
close 
relationshi
p 
% of firms 
connected 
with a 
minister or 
MP, or a 
close 
relationshi
p 
% of top 
50 firms 
connected 
with a 
minister or 
MP, or a 
close 
relationshi
p 
Connected 
firms as % 
of  market 
capitalizatio
n 
Argentina 38 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Australia 287 2 0.70 0 0.70 0.00 0.32 
Austria 110 1 0.91 0 0.91 0.20 0.25 
Belgium 157 6 3.82 0 3.82 0.80 18.77 
Brazil 167 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Canada 534 7 1.31 0 1.31 2.00 2.53 
Chile 89 2 2.25 0 2.25 4.00 1.43 
Colombia 32 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Rep. 63 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 228 7 3.07 0 3.07 6.00 2.52 
Finland 132 2 1.52 0 1.52 0.00 0.14 
France 914 16 1.75 4 2.19 10.00 8.03 
Germany 840 11 1.31 2 1.55 2.00 1.20 
Greece 153 1 0.65 0 0.65 0.00 0.09 
Hong Kong 405 3 0.74 5 1.98 6.00 2.33 
Hungary 27 1 3.70 0 3.70 3.95 2.81 
India 323 9 2.79 0 2.79 2.00 1.83 
Indonesia 154 12 7.79 22 22.08 24.00 12.76 
Ireland 82 2 2.44 0 2.44 4.00 22.83 
Israel 55 2 3.64 0 3.64 4.26 8.13 
Italy 233 24 10.30 0 10.30 16.00 11.27 
Japan 2395 31 1.29 1 1.34 2.00 1.34 
Luxembourg 23 1 4.35 0 4.35 4.55 10.48 
Malaysia 445 23 5.17 65 19.78 44.00 28.24 
Mexico 94 6 6.38 2 8.51 12.00 8.14 
Netherland 238 1 0.42 0 0.42 0.00 0.01 
New Zealand 50 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Norway 206 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Peru 37 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Phillipines 114 1 0.88 4 4.39 8.00 16.16 
Poland 57 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Portugal 101 3 2.97 0 2.97 4.00 2.00 
Russia 25 3 12.00 2 20.00 36.36 86.75 
Singapore 229 18 7.86 0 7.86 4.00 2.59 
South Africa 212 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South Korea 313 7 2.24 1 2.56 4.00 8.95 
Spain 200 3 1.50 0 1.50 0.00 0.82 
Sri Lanka 18 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sweden 280 3 1.07 0 1.07 4.00 1.02 
Switzerland 243 6 2.47 0 2.47 4.00 0.69 
Taiwan 237 2 0.84 6 3.38 10.00 12.74 
Thailand 279 23 8.24 19 15.05 34.00 41.62 
Turkey 84 1 1.19 0 1.19 0.00 0.14 
UK 2149 154 7.17 0 7.17 46.00 39.02 
US 7124 6 0.08 8 0.20 6.00 4.94 
Venezuela 18 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Zimbabwe 8 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All countries 2020
2 
400 1.98 141 2.86 6.92 7.72 
Source: Faccio, 2006 
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1.2  Relationships with Local Authority 
 
The practice of building good relationship is not a new found knowledge. In 
fact, the act of forging good relationship with local authorities (government) existed 
in all countries hundreds of years ago. In setting of Malacca Sultanate back in the 
1500s, foreign merchant from as far as China, Arabs, Indians and Persians came 
with gifts for the sultanate to forge good relationships with local monarchy. On the 
other hand, the ruler of the Malacca Sultanate also visited the emperor of China in 
order to create good relationship with them. To date, the practice of forging good 
relationships with local authority (government) still exist. However, the word ‘local 
authority’ is now more commonly termed as ‘government’ and the act of forging 
good relationship with local authority is more popularly being termed as political 
connection.  
 
 The types of political connection which exist in modern Malaysia are the 
result of the combinations of several events which unfolded during pre-
independence and post-independence years. During the pre-independence years, 
there already cease to exist one type of political connection, which is connection 
between business leaders and politician (White, 2004) 1. For example, during the 
pre-independence years, leader and tin-mining baron such as Henry Lee Hau Shik 
(or more popularly known as H. S. Lee) managed to get a banking licence to 
establish the Development & Commercial Bank which began its operation in 1966 
through close links with politician2. Mohammad Tahir Tan Tong Hye (or more 
                                                          
1 More detailed information can be found in the work of N. J. White (2004). The beginnings of crony 
capitalism: Business, politics and economic development in Malaysia, c. 1955–70. Modern Asian 
Studies. 
2 Means, Malaysian Politics, pp.202, 214; E.T. Gomez, Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, 
Accommodation and Ascendence (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999), p.33. 
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popularly known as T. H. Tan) also seemed to benefit from political ties. In 1956, he 
managed to obtain the support for an unofficial trade mission from the Federation to 
Japan which resulted in him securing a number of pioneer certificates from the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry for joint ventures with Japanese manufacturing 
concerns (White, 2004)3. In the years succeeding independence, businessman like 
T.H. Tan, Nik Kamil, Robert Kuok and Tengku Razaleigh demonstrated the 
importance of political connections for business success (White, 2004). For instance, 
Robert Kuok had already extended his business empire to hotels, timber and 
property development by the late 1960s. Brown (1994) showed that even before the 
affirmative actions are implemented, Kuok have already depended on close 
relationship with politicians to obtain pioneer position for his flour mining and sugar 
refining business.  
 
The 1969 incident is one event which exacerbated the connection between 
business leaders and politician in Malaysia and brought about another type of 
connection. Firstly, the implementation of affirmative action after 1969 intensified 
the connection between business leaders and politician. During that period, the 
Chinese businessmen were forced into close alliance with politicians and 
bureaucrats to guarantee their business survival and success. Meanwhile, Malay 
businessmen were also pushed to establish good relationships with politicians so that 
they stand a better chance in getting government contracts. Secondly, the 1969 
incident has brought about another type of political connection in Malaysia, which is 
political connection through board of directors. The implementation of affirmative 
action has led to large Chinese businesses to appoint “prominent Malays with a 
                                                          
3 Arkib Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur (hereafter ANM) Tan Siew Sin papers, SP 45/867, T. H. Tan to 
Tan Siew Sin, 20 June 1956. 
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background in politics or the civil service as company directors, mainly to serve as 
avenues to secure access to the state or bypass bureaucratic red-tape in government” 
(Gomez, 2003, p.64). 
  
Subsequently in 1982, Malaysia implemented the ‘Look East Policy’ which 
intends to learn from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, where they are regarded as 
the superpowers of the East. Their advances in industrial and economic sectors at a 
much faster rate compared to its Western counterparts have been credited to their 
good work ethics, practices and policies. Part of the initiative of this policy was the 
emphasis to develop co-operatives projects in order to facilitate the transfer of 
technology where it was to benefit both sides. Thus, the adoption of ‘Look East 
Policy’ and the intellectual transfer between Malaysia and these three countries 
could very much have mitigated the adoption of business styles and practice from 
these countries as well. The Japanese have been doing business by zaibatsu and the 
Koreans by chaebol whom have always maintained a close proximity with 
influential government officers. This particular event could have somewhat 
exacerbated the issue of political connection between business leaders and 
politicians in modern Malaysia. 
 
Last but not least, the privatization of government entities in 1991 under the 
Seventh Malaysia Plan could have brought about the existence of political 
connection through government-linked companies (GLC) in Malaysia. The intention 
of the privatization was to ‘facilitate the country’s economic growth, reduce the 
financial and administration burden of the government, reduce the government’s 
presence in the economy, lower the level and scope of public spending and allow 
market forces to govern economic activities and improve efficiency and 
11 
 
productivity’4. The process of privatization has been rather successful in alleviating 
government’s burden but the rise of quasi-state corporations pushed politicians and 
bureaucrats into the business world (White, 2004). Thus, this has also led to the 
exacerbation of political connection through board of directors.  
 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that three types of political 
connection exist in Malaysia. Firstly is political connection between business leader 
and politician (BUS). Secondly is the political connection through board of directors 
(BOARD). Thirdly is the political connection through government-linked companies 
(GLC). However, this study intends to study another type of political connection, 
which is political connection through the family ties (FAM). Although this type of 
connection is seldom being researched especially in Malaysia due to its sensitivity, 
this study will incorporate this type of connection because by doing so make our 
result more reliable and robust as it portrays a more accurate situation of the issue of 
political connection in Malaysia. The next section discusses the types of political 
connection in more detail. 
  
                                                          
4 See the official website of Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia.  
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1.3 Types of Political Connection in Malaysia 
1.3.1 Government-linked Companies 
  
As mentioned in the previous section, political connection through GLC in 
Malaysia was spurred by the initiative of the government to privatize government 
entities in 1991 under the Seventh Malaysia Plan. A firm is considered a GLC when 
government has a direct (or indirect) controlling stake in it. In other words, the 
government has the authority to elect its senior management, board of directors and 
decide on big decisions (eg. acquisitions and divestments, restructuring and 
financing, strategy and contract awards). GLCs can be controlled by the government 
directly or via Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLICs). GLICs are 
government’s investment arms that distribute government funds to the GLCs. There 
are currently five GLICs in Malaysia namely Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), 
Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera 
(LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB).  
 
A little information on the GLICs is provided as follows; KNB is Malaysia’s 
sovereign wealth fund and it is also the investment holding arm of the government. 
Its objective is to promote economic growth and make strategic investments on 
behalf of the government. All the shares of KNB are owned by the Ministry of 
Finance of Malaysia which in turn is headed by the Prime Minister.  As of 2012, 
KNB’s total asset is approximately US$29 billion. 
 
KWSP is a major institutional investor in Malaysia and it is also under the 
directive of Ministry of Finance. It is in charge of the compulsory savings plan and 
retirement planning for employees in the private sector in Malaysia. KWSP’s total 
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assets size is about US$184 billion by the end of 2013, a colossal amount which 
constitutes more than half of Malaysia’s gross domestic product (Thillainathan, 
2000). KSWP have a sturdy government control where under the law, 70 per cent of 
its funds have to be invested in Malaysian government securities (Wahab et. al, 
2009). Currently KWSP is allowed to invest up to 23% of its portfolio overseas 
where it is not allowed to do so in the past. 
 
PNB was established in 1978, which is the first unit trust set up in Malaysia 
to encourage Bumiputera shareholdings in the corporate sector. In the beginning, 
PNB only have one unit trust known as Amanah Saham Nasional but since then it 
has expanded to several unit trust which also caters for other groups. For instance, 
youths can purchase the Amanah Saham Didik while the non-Bumiputeras can opt 
for Amanah Saham Nasional which pays a handsome dividend of about 8 percent a 
year. By the end of 2003, its net worth is approximately US$4 billion.  
 
LTAT was established in 1972 and it functions as a retirement fund for the 
Armed Forces of Malaysia. Its process is also similar to KWSP where it is 
compulsory for its employees to pay ten percent of their monthly salary to LTAT 
while their employer (the government) is required to pay fifteen percent every 
month. LTAT’s dividend payment has also been historically high (approximately 8 
percent per year not including special bonuses).  
 
LTH is a premiere Islamic financial institution in Malaysia which was 
formed in 1963.  With a fund of more than RM41billion, it is the country's biggest 
Islamic fund manager with the intention of encouraging Malaysian Muslims to save 
for pilgrimage journeys to Mecca. More recently, it has also ventured into 
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investment sector in accordance with Islamic principles and is able to provide 
competitive returns to its stakeholders annually. All their investments are in 
accordance with syariah by roping in the help of investment advisory board which 
includes Islamic scholars. 
 
GLCs and GLICs have an imperative part to play in the country’s 
economic structure. In terms of market capitalization, GLCs account for 
approximately RM260 billion or almost 36% of Bursa Malaysia. Moreover, 
GLCs employs for a projected 5% of the domestic labor force as they are 
involved in much aspects of the country such as in the area of water and 
sewerage, telecommunication, electricity, postal services, airports, banking, 
financial services and public transport5. Furthermore, GLCs play an imperative 
part in implementing government policies and also in building knowledge and 
competencies in important areas. On the aspect of global economic 
liberalization, GLCs and GLICs are gradually playing a more dynamic and 
major role by establishing global economic connections through investments in 
overseas projects and investments in new growth areas.  
 
1.3.2 Board of Directors 
  
Politically connected board of directors (BOARD) can be classified as firms 
which have indirect political connection. Politically connected board of directors is 
defined as former government servant or politicians who holds directorship in a 
firm’s board of directors.  According to Lim (1981), they are commonly appointed 
to execute ‘extra-economic functions’ such as facilitating dealings with the 
                                                          
5 Refer to the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG) website for further information.  
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government, specifically to help these firms bypass bureaucratic red-tape. Past 
literatures which are related to this study are papers like Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2001) which investigated whether board of directors can add value to the firm. In 
recent years, there are growing investigations which looked into the aspects of 
director characteristics. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2004) examined boards 
that have female directors. Ferris et al. (2003), Perry and Peyer (2005), and Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) investigated the effects of having board of directors with 
numerous board seats. Lastly, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Guner et al. (2006) 
emphasized on boards of directors that possessed banking background. In 
accordance with the investigations done by these previous researches, this thesis 
focuses on directors with the unique characteristic of having a political background.  
 
As mentioned by Kakabadse, Ward, Korac-Kakabadse and Bowman (2001), 
directors with a well-established network of contacts within the city is recognized by 
numerous CEOs and chairmen as particularly useful. In addition, Goldman, Rocholl 
and So (2009) investigated how each board member's past political affiliation affect 
the value of procurement contracts awarded to their respective firms in the U.S.. 
Their result suggested that firms which are connected to the winning team side are 
more likely to receive an increasing amount of procurement contracts.  
 
In the context of this study, Gomez (2003) has mentioned about the politically 
connected board of directors. For example, Mohammed Hanif Omar, the former 
Inspector-General of Police, is a director of companies in Lim Goh Tong’s gaming 
group, Genting, and Azman Hashim’s financial group, AMMB Holdings; he also 
holds directorships in a number of quoted companies outside the top 100 list. Alwi 
Jantan, another prominent ex-senior bureaucrat – he was Director of Public Service 
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in the Public Services Department – sits on the boards of foreign-owned Guinness 
Anchor and Resorts World, of the Genting group. Mohd Ghazali Seth, a director of 
Chinese-owned Magnum and the foreign-owned firms, Carlsberg and Nestle´, was 
chief of the armed forces, as was Mohd Ghazali Che Mat who serves as a director of 
the politically well-connected Malakoff and the government-controlled Kumpulan 
Guthrie. Yahya Ismail, who holds directorships in the Chinese firms, YTL Corp and 
Southern Bank, foreign controlled Shell, and the politically well-connected UEM, 
served in a number of key government posts, including Director General of the 
Livestock Authority and Chairman of the Totalisator Board.  
 
However, the author did not conduct studies on how these politically board 
of directors could affect the performance of the firm. Thus, this thesis hopes to fill 
this gap. One of the challenges faced while conducting this study is defining and 
identifying firms which engage the service of politically connected board of 
directors. This will be further explained in Chapter 3.  
 
1.3.3 Business Ties 
 
According to Gomez and Jomo (1997), there are two types of political 
favouritism that exist in Malaysia. The first type is the official status that is given to 
firms that are owned by ethnic Malays. The second type is the informal relations that 
existed between leading politicians and firms that are run by both Malay and 
Chinese business people. Relationships between businessman in Malaysia and 
politicians sometimes happened even before the politicians stepped into the office. 
In Gomez and Jomo (1997), the connection between firm and politicians appeared to 
have been primarily on chance personal histories. Most of the time, connections with 
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politicians happened even before they were elected into office as ministers. Some 
were forged during childhood years and some were during their university days. 
However, not all relationships happen before politicians stand for office. Some of 
them were forged after they have been elected. Thus, there are reasonable evidence 
to propose political connections – similar to family control and state control – is 
another dimension of control that appears to create economic value (Chen, Ariff, 
Hassan & Mohamad, 2013). 
 
When the affirmative action was implemented in 1970 to correct the 
economic imbalance between races in Malaysia, Chinese businessman immediately 
felt the pinch because this means they are going to lose their shares in some of the 
future economic development in the country. In order to overcome the possibility of 
bad performance of their firm, they began to forge good relationships with leading 
politician so that they could protect what they have, or in some cases perhaps to even 
increase the value of their firm. Consistent with the rent-seeking theory, the objective 
of Chinese businessman in Malaysia is to secure profit maximization. They obtain 
advantages from rent-seeking behaviour through connections to politicians in power. 
Such advantages include higher opportunity to undertake very valuable projects, 
convenience to funding and monopoly control of the trade. Besides Malaysia, 
developing countries like India, Brazil and Mexico have also relied on politically 
connected firms to bring out economic development through state-funded schemes 
during the period of pre-war (Woo, 1998). However, such activities create 
disorientation in the market place particularly where private sector is non-existence at 
the initial phase of economic growth. Rent-seeking is a tactic to generate additional 
value by these Chinese businessmen because according to Krueger’s (1974) model, 
rent seeking firms will try to create a barrier to entry and monopolize the production 
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line. This distortion will create an artificial market price for a product, which in turn 
will earn a high profit margin. One of the Chinese businessmen who gained 
tremendously from his political tie with leading politicians is Vincent Tan Chee 
Yioun. He has been described by the late Australian journalist Barry Wain in his 
book “Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohammad in Turbulent Times” as the chief 
non-Malay crony in Malaysia. Vincent Tan is the founder and former Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Berjaya Corporation Berhad which covers a wide 
businesses area of property, resorts, and gambling, food and beverage and education. 
Other Chinese businessman includes Quek Leng Chan, Ting Pek Khiing, Yeoh Tiong 
Lay and Robert Kuok.  
 
Besides Chinese businessman, Malay businessman have also benefited from 
close relationship they have with leading politicians. One of them is Syed Mokhtar 
Al-Bukhary, who is arguably one of the most successful Malay businessmen in 
Malaysia. His business empire covers industries like property, plantation, 
transportation, defense and even power generation. He also owns the Heavy 
Industries Corporation of Malaysia (also known as Hicom) which was set up by the 
government in 1980. Hicom later on invested in the cement, steel and automotive 
business. Hicom is one of the largest developments where government picks which 
private sector firms will obtain access to investment funds from the government 
(Perkins and Woo, 2000). Besides Syed Mokhtar Al-Bukhary, other notable Malay 
businessman includes Halim Saad, Tajuddin Ramli and Rashid Hussain. Halim Saad 
owns public-listed companies such as Renong, United Engineers (M) (UEM), Kinta 
Kellas, Time Enginerring and Ho Hup Construction. Throughout the 1997 financial 
crisis, funds were channeled to a privileged few such as the likes of Halim Saad 
through state or well-connected businessman’s financial institutions. According to a 
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report by Euromoney, about 45 percent of the RM39 billion lent by banks for stock 
purchase, were given to individuals (Gomez, 2003). During that period, Renong, had 
already amassed around RM20–28 billion of debts and this figure is more than 5 
percent of loans by the Malaysian banking system (Gomez, 2003). According to 
government leaders, assistance should be given to Renong as this big expanded 
enterprise was a representation of the progress of Malay capital (Gomez, 2003). As 
the government is being more active in distributing favours to firms, businessmen 
have gradually used personal connections to influence the distribution of those 
favours (Gomez & Jomo, 1997).  
 
1.3.4 Family Ties 
 
Political connection can also exist through family ties with government 
leaders. In the case of Indonesia, where political and economic power should be 
practicing the arm’s length relationship, lines have been blurred as politician’s 
families began to be involved in the economy. According to Gomez (2003), Suharto 
family owns approximately US$5 billion worth of private and publicly listed 
business in Indonesia in 1996. Following the financial crisis in 1997, companies 
owned by Suharto’s children reportedly had debts amounting to US$4 billion 
(Gomez, 2003). Besides Suharto, other members of Indonesia’s ruling elite, or their 
relatives, had also managed to develop a huge stake in the country’s corporate 
sector. The family members of Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta have interest in 
various industries such as oil, insurance, banking, media, manufacturing, maritime, 
education, real estate and transport where their wealth ranged between US$100 
million and US$1 billion. In the case of Xi JinPing, the current President of 
Republic of China, his extended family members have business interest in real 
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estate, minerals and mobile-phone industry. According to reports by Bloomberg, 
Xi’s family’s assets were traced to his sister, his brother-in-law and his niece. In 
India, powerful families such as the Nehru-Gandi family have dominated its political 
arena, making only a few families extremely rich from its 40 years of dominance. 
Sonia Gandhi who belongs to the Nehru-Gandhi family by marriage and is also 
serving as the President of the Indian National Congress since 1998, have a net 
worth of approximately US$2 billion. 
 
In Malaysia, family members of government leaders are also involved in 
businesses or holds directorship in public-listed companies. For example, sons of the 
fourth Prime Minister, Mokhzani Tun Mahathir, sits on the board of Opcom 
Holdings Berhad and Maxis Berhad while Mukhriz Tun Mahathir, sits on the board 
of Reliance Pacific Berhad. Besides that, the current Prime Minister of Malaysia 
Najib Razak, also have immediate family members who sit on the board of several 
firms. For example, his brother Ahmad Johari Razak, sits on the board of five firms 
namely Ancom Berhad, British American Tobacco (Malaysia), Nylex Berhad 
Berhad, Hong Leong Industries and  Daiman Development Berhad.   
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1.4 Problem Statement 
 
Calomiris and Ramirez (1996) once said that almost all countries, including 
the United States have at some point in their history relied heavily on relationships, 
particularly in earlier stages of development. Relationship-based system works better 
than arm’s-length system in relatively less developed economies – those where 
contracts are ineffective and price signals from the market relatively uninformative 
(Rajan & Zingales, 2005). In emerging countries, relationship-based economy is a 
common practice and Malaysia is not an exception Gomez (2003). This is further 
substantiated by Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) which documented the total 
politically connected (PCON) firms in Malaysia to be 81. This amount is only second 
to the United Kingdom, which have 118 PCON firms. However, Malaysia’s capital 
market size is much smaller compared to that of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the 
percentage of PCON firms in Malaysia is considered high (Wahab & Rahman, 2009). 
Even though the proportion of PCON firms is high, the number of studies which 
focuses on Malaysia is low compared with the likes of the United States. Moreover, 
findings from previous studies could not specifically pinpoint whether political 
connection have positive or negative effect on firm performance. Examples of past 
literatures which found the positive effect of political connection on firm 
performance are Gomez and Jomo (1997), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Mitchell and 
Joseph (2010), Fazilah (1996) and Fraser, Zhang and Derashid (2006). Past 
literatures which found negative relationship between political connection and firm 
performance are Wahab et al. (2009), Bliss, Gul and Majid (2011) and Bliss and Gul 
(2012). As such, the relationship between political connections and firm performance 
is still very much debatable. Part of the motivation of this study is to contribute to the 
existing literatures on the effect of political connection on firm performance in the 
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context of Malaysia. A stronger understanding of the advantages and disadvantages 
of political connection is imminent to determine their impact of firm performance 
which may lead to better corporate governance in Malaysia. 
 
Secondly, most, if not all of the studies conducted on this subject in Malaysia 
hails from only one source which is Gomez and Jomo (1997). Such studies include 
Johnson and Mitton (2003), Mitchell and Joseph (2010), Bliss and Gul (2012), 
Wahab et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2013) and Ebrahim, Girma, Shah and Williams 
(2014). These studies adopt the list of PCON firms from Gomez and Jomo (1997) 
without examining whether the connected person is still with the company. The study 
done by Gomez and Jomo (1997) was done almost 18 years ago and an update in the 
data provided by them is necessary to ensure the results obtained are reliable. 
Unfortunately, most studies have overlooked this concern. This study attempts to 
rectify this situation by using updated data from Gomez and Jomo (1997) and also by 
adding several other measures on political connection. More detailed description on 
how the data are updated is described in Chapter 3.  
 
Thirdly, as mentioned by Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006), political 
connection can be divided into several types such as connection through family 
relationship, childhood friends, minister or MP (Member of Parliament) and state-
owned enterprise. Previous studies like Gomez and Jomo (1997), Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) and Chen et al. (2013) does not study into such detailed relationship. While 
there are studies like Mitchell and Joseph (2010) and Ebrahim et al. (2014) which 
attempts to look into this aspect, their classification of connection types is confusing 
and unclear. For example, the study of Mitchell and Joseph (2010) classified GLC 
and Khazanah as two separate categories of PCON when they should be classified 
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under the same category because Khazanah is only of the five GLICs (Government-
linked Investment Companies) which controls the listed GLCs in Malaysia. This 
study attempts to rectify this situation by categorizing PCON firms into a more 
accurate and organized group. This study classifies PCON firms into four categories 
and they are government-linked companies (GLC), politically connected board of 
directors (BOARD), political connection with businessman (BUS) and political 
connection through family members of leading politician (FAM). 
 
 This study also covers the period of twelve years (2002 – 2013). Previous 
studies like Johnson and Mitton (2003) covers the period of two years (1997 – 1998), 
Gul (2006) utilizes three years (1996 – 1998), Wahab et al. (2009) utilizes five years 
(1999- 2003), Faccio et al. (2006) covers six years (1997 – 2002), Mitchell and 
Joseph (2010) uses seven years (2000 – 2006). A longer period of study is expected 
to increase the accuracy of the result and also to examine the effect of political 
connection after year 2006, which wasn’t covered by most of the studies mentioned 
above. Political landscape in Malaysia has also changed in the past ten years and a 
new study would provide a new insight into the impact of political connection on 
firm performance. 
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1.5 Research Questions 
 
Based on the discussion in problem statement, the following questions are raised. 
1) Is there any connection between politically connected firms and firm 
performance in the long-run? 
2) Do connection types affect firm performance differently in the long-run?  
3) Under specific events, does political connection influence firm performance? 
 
1.6 Research Objectives  
 
The above research questions indicate the need of the study to be conducted to 
achieve the following objectives. 
1) To examine the relationship between political connection and firm 
performance in the long-run. 
2) To examine how types of connection among politically connected firms 
influence firm performance differently in the long-run. 
3) To examine the influence of political connection on firm performance under 
specific events. 
  
